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Abstract 
Port infrastructure and its affiliated services are the key drivers of economic growth particularly when 
consideration is given to the reality that over 80 % of the world‟s merchandize trade by volume is transshipped 
by sea. The status quo is especially relevant to Member States of the Caribbean Community (hereinafter, 
CARICOM). First and foremost, this region is comprised mainly of island states. Secondly, it is nestled at the 
intersection of the world‟s primary North-South and East-West trade flows making it a key maritime highway. 
Thirdly, it is home to roughly 351 ports, 15 oil refineries and 51 tank terminals while hosting three separate 
categories of ports - specialized ports that cater for single commodities; public ports which are open to all types 
of cargo, and by no means the least, transshipment centers. Of late, increasing demands have been placed on the 
region‟s port communities by the booming cruise ship and yachting industries. Nonetheless, despite the 
exceptional geographic providence of the region, across-the-board low growth rates, fiscal stress, elevated debt 
levels, and declines in international reserves have placed serious constraints on the economies of CARICOM 
Member States. Most importantly, inherent structural gaps in port infrastructure in tandem with the 
undercapitalization of port facilities have been identified as key constraints to trade performance impeding 
investment opportunities. The Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) promoted by China which is an integral 
component the country‟s „Go Global‟ policy is an ambitious trans-regional scheme that is specially configured 
to promote interconnectivity and economic agglomeration which are critical imperatives among Caribbean 
Community members at this juncture. What‟s more, MSRI has a heavy infrastructural dimension. This study 
argues that MSRI holds reciprocal advantages for China and the Caribbean Community.   
------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Among the advantages is development of port communities in the region which will fulfill China‟s relentless 
drive for trade promotion, strengthened connectivity, access to strategically key resources, as well as enhanced 
regional and global competitiveness given the region‟s proximity to the United States and Central and South 
America. The Chinese business model on which MSRI is built guarantees client governments ease of access to 
funding while building their respective domestic infrastructural capacities:  Chinese ground plans typically take 
the form of closely coordinated projects facilitated by clusters of inter-related state-controlled corporations and 
Chinese policy banks which are reputed for high-speed delivery untypical of Western multilateral bodies like the 
World Bank. The study concludes that if judiciously managed by Caribbean governments, port infrastructure 
development under the aegis of the Maritime Silk Road Initiative holds transformative potential for the region in 
light of the dire need for investment, diversification and trade facilitation which are indispensable to economic 
take-off.  
Keywords: China; Caribbean; China-Caribbean Economic Relations; Maritime Silk Road Initiative; port 
infrastructure development; Caribbean strategic sectors; China-Caribbean Observatory. 
1. Introduction 
The People‟s Republic of China (hereinafter China) has shown itself prepared to plough exorbitant sums of 
money into projects on a large scale to develop infrastructure, trade, and critical aspects of connectivity in the 
Caribbean Basin despite the fact the Caribbean and Latin America (excluding Mexico) account for a mere 6.7 
percent of its global imports and 4.17 percent of its global exports. Capital flows from China into Caribbean 
countries have been primarily in the form of aid for the purpose of funding infrastructural projects built by 
Chinese enterprises [1]. In what would appear at first glance to be contradistinctive, foreign direct investments 
received by China originate from three main sources – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 
Japan and the Republic of Korea. In combination, these accounted for an estimated 14 % of FDIs as of 2007 -
2008, at the height of the global economic crisis. This was regarded as considerable in light of the fact that: (i) 
around 4 % to 6 % of total FDIs during that period came from North America and the European Union; (ii) 2 % 
came from Taiwan Province of China; and (iii) 4 % came from Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of 
China. Thus, the ASEAN countries were the major sources of inflows to China. The Caribbean and Latin 
America, on the other hand, were the second largest major sources of FDI inflows, having contributed roughly a 
quarter of the total in 2007 – 2008. By the same token, it should be noted that 99 % of this latter investment 
originated from the British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands, which are tax havens [2]. In reality therefore, 
the Caribbean and Latin America account for less than 1% of FDIs going to China averaging between USD $70- 
$80 million, with Argentina, Brazil and Mexico accounting for the largest share. This leaves the Caribbean 
Community‟s share as a portion of FDIs to China as negligible by all accounts.  Furthermore, notwithstanding 
the fact that trade agreements in the Caribbean Community have fallen short of creating the necessary demand 
pull for broad-based rationalization of resource allocation, diversification of production, and expansion of goods 
exports, Chinese investments in this part of the hemisphere have galloped away between 2005- 2020 [3].  The 
countries comprising the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) cover an area of roughly 177.000 square miles 
and have a total population of 18 million. Formed in 1974, CARICOM is a collective of Caribbean nations and 
dependencies in and around the Caribbean Sea, most of which emerged from a British colonial history. It 
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comprises 20 countries of which 15 are full members and 5 are associated members.  Among its full members 
are 14 independent states: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, 
Haiti, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and 
Tobago. The remaining full member state, Montserrat, is a British dependency.  Most CARICOM members are 
island states, while Belize is located in Central America and Guyana and Suriname in South America. Among 
the significant geopolitical features of this grouping is its proximity to the United States as a‟ third border,‟ 
continental actors in Latin America and the interests of European powers such as the British, French and 
Netherlands which maintain a territorial presence in the form of dependencies, and in the case of France, 
„departments‟. Exports from CARICOM are precariously built on very few and select primary products making 
the economies in this part of the world especially vulnerable to external shocks, in particular, global fluctuations 
in commodity price and perennial tropical cyclones. Furthermore, notwithstanding the active embrace of trade 
liberalization policies, the adoption of free trade agreements, partial scope agreements, and preferential trade 
arrangements by Caribbean governments and despite being endowed with relatively open economies to facilitate 
such negotiated arrangements for over three decades service and goods exports declined in competitiveness with 
respective trade partners. A stocktaking of regional infrastructure needs (Bahamas Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, 
Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago) which was undertaken by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)in 
2019 discloses that the lack of quality and updated infrastructure and interconnectivity are key factors 
constraining trade and competitiveness among CARICOM members. This was attributed to the uneven coverage 
of infrastructural stock and the under-capitalization of critical supporting infrastructure and connectivity such as 
electricity, ground transportation, information technology and telecommunications [4]. Qualifying this finding 
are the observations emanating from the World Bank flagship publication “Doing Business 2020,” which noted 
that no economies in the region ranked among the top 50 in the world on the ease of doing business; neither did 
CARICOM economies feature in the top 10 improved list over the past two years. China, on the other hand, has 
grown exponentially to become the largest merchandize exporter in the world apart from becoming the world‟s 
second largest economy based on IMF purchasing power parity (PPP), having seized a handsome share of over 
14 percent of global exports. Moreover, China has registered an unprecedented number of signature projects in 
CARICOM over a fifteen-year period in a broad array of areas particularly infrastructure, agriculture, health, 
and education. In point of fact, the economic titan maintains a progressively widening trade deficit with 
CARICOM which, given International Trade Center calculations, remains overwhelmingly in its favor [5].  
Having regard to these noteworthy asymmetries, why then is China attracted to the Caribbean region and why 
are Chinese authorities – the Government, State-controlled corporations and private enterprises - prepared to 
throw their weight behind investments in port infrastructure and closely related investments?  The propensity 
towards deepened trade and economic ties with Caribbean nations is consistently iterated the public 
pronouncements of President Xi Jinping himself and many high ranking P.R.C. officials including the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Yi stated that China views the Caribbean „from a strategic height and long-term 
perspective,‟ in identifying the subregion as a natural extension of the global 21st Century Maritime Silk Road 
(hereinafter „the MSRI‟). Adopting an empirical methodological approach which exposes potentially 
incriminating indices that  underscore  marked structural gaps in quality infrastructure, economic growth, public 
debt fiscal consolidation, trade concentration, the dispersed nature of Caribbean Community economies, 
substantive cross-country differences, and a disproportionate dependence on external markets, this enquiry 
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argues that the MSRI is mutually reinforcing in respect of Chinese and CARICOM interests, especially so, in 
the spheres of port infrastructure development. The MSRI comprises an elaborate and complementary package 
of mega projects that are in alignment with China‟s long-term strategic goals and buttressed by vehicles for the 
financing of development loans – a facility that regional banks and traditional Western lending institutions 
appear not to have satisfactorily addressed. What‟s more, the initiative capitalizes on the Caribbean‟s distinctive 
geographical providence - a maritime environment at the crossroads of East-West and North-South trade flows 
as well as a shared economic space, the latter anchored in the provisions of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 
which enunciates the obligations among Member States under common market arrangements. These explain 
China‟s proclivity toward heavy investments in port development infrastructure at strategic nodes along the 
archipelagic chain of island states comprising CARICOM, stretching from the Commonwealth of the Bahamas 
in the northernmost parts to mainland Guyana, in the southward extremity.  
Table 1: Rankings of CARICOM Member States, World Bank Business Report 2020 
CARICOM Member States   Doing Business 2020 Rank 
Jamaica 71 
St. Lucia 93 
Trinidad and Tobago 105 
Dominica 111 
The Bahamas 119 
Barbados 128 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 130 
Guyana 134 
Belize 135 
St. Kitts and Nevis 139 
Grenada 146 
Suriname 162 
Haiti 179 
Source: World Bank Business Report 2020, Caribbean Trade Law and Development 
Admittedly, foreign policy, defence and security considerations of participating Member States is a key driver 
that informs their engagements with China and have an incontrovertible role to play in Chinese investments 
monetary and otherwise, in the Caribbean Community. Concurrents such as these,which underpin Beijing‟s 
geostrategy and are germane to the concerns and interests of traditional hegemons in the hemisphere like the 
United States and the European Union, lie beyond the core strands of the present enquiry. Given these 
considerations, it is reasonable to surmise, all things equal, that port infrastructure development in the region 
over the near to medium term would continue apace, more so, in light of Beijing‟s stepped-up diplomacy in the 
form of elevated institutionalized dialogue with the region‟s political elite. The trend hit a series of high spots 
between 2018 and 2019 with the signing of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) for the Belt and Road 
Initiative (OBOR) in close succession by Trinidad and Tobago (May 2018); Antigua and Barbuda (June 2018); 
Suriname (July 2018); Guyana (July 2018); Grenada (September 2018); Dominica (2018); Barbados (February 
2019); and Jamaica (April 2019). The substantive arrangements under these agreements which are mirrored in 
the CELAC - China Joint Plan of Action on Cooperation in Priority Areas (2019-2021), and signal deepening 
ties between China and Caribbean partners. The main conclusion of this study is that port infrastructure 
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development advances the mutual interests of China and Caribbean Community members [6].                                                
2. Foreign Direct Investment Flows 
The last three decades have witnessed a surge in global foreign direct investments FDIs) hand in hand with 
heightened interest in FDIs as a source of economic activity. Illustrative of this, between 2000-2016 the share of 
FDI stock to global GDP increased from 22 % to 35 %. This escalation has far-reaching ramifications for origin 
and destination countries in terms of economic growth, productivity, wages and employment. Furthermore, the 
expansion of multinational enterprises and related FDI flows has given rise to complex cross-border production 
chains which also have important implications for source and destination countries. A third notable trend is 
specific types of shifts being experienced in the FDI landscape. For example, from the 2000s onward evidence 
suggests that FDIs and exports have been operating not as opposing factors but as complementary strategies that 
are adapted to serve foreign markets. Illustrative of this China‟s regulatory framework, as argued by Sauvant 
and Chen, serves as an inducement for off-shore direct investments to enable firms to be more internationally 
competitive, since consistent with state policy, China‟s regulatory framework has transitioned from restricting 
off-shore investments to supporting them [7].  It is projected that the future of the MSRI would be contingent to 
economic and political determinants of host/participating countries. The author in [1] noted that capital flows 
from China into the Caribbean have been escalating, are heavily concentrated in infrastructure projects and 
enjoy a high level of state involvement by the Chinese government. The Chinese government has adopted a 
range of business schemes which are directly managed by state-owned enterprises operating in tandem with 
Chinese policy and commercial banks, medium-sized multinational enterprises (which comprise an estimated 99 
% of businesses in China) and, more recently, private companies which are benefitting from a newfound level of 
visibility. The latter development comes on the heels of a massive anti-corruption crackdown spearheaded by 
President Xi Jinping himself, an offshoot of which was the departure of thousands of high ranking state officials 
from large corporations that were being purged of corrupt practices.                   
3. Layout of the Study 
This study is arranged as follows: Introduction which is segmented into Materials and Methods - Premise of the 
Enquiry, Statement of Hypothesis, Previous and Ongoing Studies, Limitations of the Study, and Theoretical and 
Empirical Considerations. Part I, entitled, “Overview of China‟s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk 
Road Initiative” provides a description of the impetus behind China‟s “Go Global” (zu chuqu) push and its 
formal inauguration under President Xi Jinping. It describes China‟s trade portfolio and the extent to which it is 
skewed in favor of Asia- Pacific jurisdictions.  This section of the study considers the systemic challenges 
confronting Caribbean economies that underscore the need for urgent intervention through long-term planning 
and prudent capitalization. It also elaborates on the importance of the maritime domain, port infrastructure 
development, port specialization and logistics as crucial vectors for trade promotion, economic development and 
transregional partnerships. Part II focusses on the providential aspects of the region as a maritime hub housing 
principal North South and East West maritime highways and complex interrelated layers of transshipment 
networks. It describes the key drivers of trade in the Caribbean Community and the imperative to match these 
trade flows with systemic gaps in port infrastructure requirements. In essence, this calls for a port community 
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mindset which host governments appear to be gravitating toward, as reflected in their respective long-term 
national development plans, which are carefully chronicled. Reciprocally, China‟s business model, as reflected 
in its ground plans in the region, reflects a proclivity towards undertaking clusters of coordinated and 
interconnected projects all of which are heavily capitalized by Chinese policy banks and state-controlled 
corporations. This is followed by Results, Conclusions, Acknowledgements and References. 
4. Materials and Methods 
Premise of the Enquiry 
The premise of this enquiry is that the free movement of goods, services and information rapidly, reliably and 
cheaply across borders (i.e. the bulwark of supply chain logistics) facilitates trade, development. and 
competitiveness. This premise explains the all-important concern among Caribbean Community Member States 
to aggressively pursue port infrastructure development. Foregrounding this study are three pertinent factors.  
The first factor evolves around the advantages of geographical „location‟ and the implications of „island state‟ 
status. The second factor pivots around the economics of trade. The third factor is circumscribed by logistics, 
i.e. the quality, affordability and availability of vital support services inclusive of shipping, ports and related 
maritime services and how these intersect with economic realities in contributing towards an efficiently operated 
port community [8].  Location and Island State status: Being mostly island states, the trade of Caribbean 
countries is conducted primarily by air or ship and the latter is by far the more dominant means of transport. In 
fact, CARICOM members depend to a greater extent on transport for economic survival that other countries in 
Latin America and the Caribbean and this dependency relates as much to exports as it does to imports. This 
includes the transportation of goods for private consumption as well as commodities essential to support the 
provision of services such as tourism as the mainstay of many economies. In turn, the costs of transportation of 
goods is affected by the distances to be travelled and the. nature of cargo along with other factors that are 
location sensitive as for example port dues, tariffs, the waiting period at seaports, freight rates, insurance 
premiums as well as inland transport costs. Economics: World Bank studies have established firstly, that there 
exists s a negative relation between foreign investment and transport costs and implies  that maritime transport 
services would lead to more foreign investment; secondly, that maritime industries and services provide taxable 
income and employment but that the protection of these industries from foreign investors could lead to less 
efficient transport and the dampening of trade, underscoring the benefits of liberalization;  and thirdly,  that 
diversification (which incidentally is the goal of many regional governments seeking  to reduce dependency on 
too few commodities) could lead to increased unit costs since the use of specialized cargo to take ships to a final 
destination is more efficient than general cargo taking a variety of products to transshipment centers.  
Logistics: The third factor foregrounding this study relates to the quality of logistical needs at ports region-wide. 
On this score, the Inter-American Development Bank had undertaken of port infrastructure facilities many 
decades ago on which it based specific recommendations for upgrades. To date, most of these have not been 
fully addressed. A few are itemized herein:  Barbados:  increased berthing and storage space, and a new Ro Ro 
facility; Guyana: dredging, navigational aids, container facility, general upgrading; Jamaica: expanded container 
facilities in Kingston (which has since been addressed); St Kitts and Nevis: port expansion; Suriname: roofing 
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for sheds, asphalting of quays, dredging, container facilities; Trinidad and Tobago:  modernization of Port of 
Spain‟s capital stock and waterfront development. Currently, the  shipping services in CARICOM consist of 
four main groupings that operate simultaneously and complementarily; inter-island transport undertaken by 
small tramp vessels; short sea-shipping which connects the islands; deep sea shipping, which uses larger vessels 
to transport cargo directly from the Caribbean to Europe, Asia and farther regions; and fourthly, shipments of 
non-Caribbean cargo  which pass through the Caribbean due to the location of the region at the crossroads of 
major transcontinental shipping routes.  Taken in totality, the above factors underscore the importance of 
maritime transportation, its relevance to Caribbean countries and the importance of ports and shipping 
arrangements as vectors for successful trade. The study argues that the MSRI holds reciprocal benefits for China 
and Caribbean Community Member States. The factors also underscore the logic that less expensive transport 
fuels more foreign trade. MSRI comprises a network of trans-regional economic corridors emanating from the 
Asia Pacific region across continents and is poised to provide a platform for Caribbean Community member 
states while addressing infrastructural deficits and mobilizing capital flows that are vital to long-term 
investment. For this reason, there are geopolitical and geostrategic ramifications for this mega-project which is 
commodiously aligned with the China – CELAC Joint Plan of Action for Priority Areas (2019 - 2021). Under 
this intergovernmental arrangement  partner nations of the Caribbean and Latin American counterparts  have 
institutionalized their dialogue  and jointly committed to: (a)  promoting cooperation in infrastructure  between 
CELAC and China in terms of design, connectivity, execution of work, operations and administration; (b) 
fostering cooperation and investment in sectors such as railways, roads, ports, airports, logistics systems, 
information and telecommunications technology, electric power etc.; and (c) participating in priority projects 
that favor the integration of Latin American and Caribbean community and interconnectivity between States of 
CELAC and China, respectively, through already existing mechanisms.                                                   
5. Statement of Hypothesis 
The central hypothesis of this study is that China‟s 21st. Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative holds 
considerable transformative potential for Member States of the Caribbean Community that is mutually 
reinforcing, if judiciously managed. Two critical push factors are driving this endeavor - geographical 
providence and economic necessity. The Caribbean is home to three layers of transshipment networks made up 
of global transshipment hubs, regional hubs and service ports that support a dense network of shipping linkages 
at the crossroads of East-West and North-South maritime corridors. However, in parallel with this, incriminating 
indices emanating from the World Bank and IMF paint a daunting picture of economic under-performance, 
persistent public debt, fiscal stress, and substantial port infrastructure deficits. Key to the success of China‟s 
grand scheme is the efficiency of supply chain logistics and interconnectivity underpinning the region‟s port 
system. This underscores the high priority to port infrastructure development assigned by the respective 
governments. Using empirical evidence, and drawing illustrations from country experiences and relevant United 
Nations ECLAC surveys, the paper concludes that port infrastructure investment is a promising area for present 
and long-term economic cooperation between China and Caribbean Community Member States and holds 
reciprocal benefits. One such mechanism is the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2030, 
specifically Goal No.9 under which the wider international community committed to global cooperation in the 
spheres of infrastructural development of transportation facilities and supporting connectivity like 
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telecommunications which were at uneven stages of development in many developing countries [9]. 
6. Previous and Ongoing Studies 
The global dominance of a non-Western nation has literally shaped the meta narrative surrounding China‟s 
ostensibly imposing presence in strategically significant parts of the Western Hemisphere. A less discussed 
component of the narrative, however, is the role of the Caribbean Community in China‟s widening sphere of 
influence in the West. Not surprisingly, a substantial amount of focus has been placed by occidental scholars on 
juxtaposing China‟s meteoric rise and expansion across regions against Western interests more so, the United 
States. For this reason, the Caribbean has remained peeripheral in emerging scholarship and confined to 
monographs and featured articles that appear to be a knee-jerk response to each major milestone the Asian giant 
is perceived as making. Seminal works such as. Martin Jacques‟s far-sighted opus, “When China Rules the 
World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World” have argued that China‟s rise 
signals the end of the dominance of Western countries and a reversion to its position of its traditional position as 
the center of a tributary system with an un-accompanying sense of superiority. Jacques‟s reconfiguration, 
however, fails to address China‟s impact on sub-regions considered to be the outliers of the United States [10]. 
This gap is called attention to in “The Twilight of America‟s Omnipresence: China‟s Aggrandizement in a New 
Era of Multipolarity”, a comparative study which scans the full breadth of Chinese expansionism across regions 
(including Latin America and the Caribbean) and in all decisive domains, thereby setting the stage for greater 
depth in analysis [11]. This opportunity has not been exploited to the fullest prior to the inauguration of the 
China | Caribbean Observatory in 2019.  The project is designed to maintain a repository of engagements 
between China and the Caribbean Community between 2005 moving forward, and a continuing survey of 
developments in strategically significant areas in this part of the hemisphere [11].  Robert Evan Ellis, faculty 
member at the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) US Army War College PA), has been intellectually active for 
more than two decades in examining and commenting on the impact of Chinese engagements in Latin America 
and the Caribbean.  His earliest works, “China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (2013)” “The 
Strategic Dimension of Chinese Engagement in Latin America (2014)” and “China on the Ground in Latin 
America” provide an illumination of the multidimensional strands of China-Latin America relations and reflect 
a decidedly continental bent. Ellis considers the South American continent as a mosaic of sub-regions and 
analyzes economic, political, diplomatic and military components of the Chinese presence in each of these 
regions and how these partnerships are likely to impact on U.S. security and defence priorities. His subsequent 
monographs incorporate descriptive accounts of Chinese engagements in select countries of the Anglophone 
region, their political, economic, environmental and cultural dimensions and the potential challenges Chinese 
encroachment may present on the interests of the United States. Among his country-specific briefs on 
CARICOM members are: (i) “Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration and Less Told Stories of 
Globalization,” (ii) “Chinse Commercial Engagements with Guyana,” and more recently in 2019 (iii) “China‟s 
Engagement in Trinidad and Tobago” (26 March 2019). These studies were largely expository in nature and 
policy prescriptions for host governments have filtered into his more recent work.  Despite the contemporaneity 
of his research, port infrastructure development has not been addressed.  Perhaps, the most proximate reference 
to this topic was contained in a compilation of essays, entitled, “The Strategic Dimension of Chinese 
Engagement in Latin America.” The collection was intended to: (i) lend clarity to the strategic dimensions of 
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how Chinese engagements were impacting on the political dynamics within and between states in the region in 
strategic military sectors, military to military engagements, and emerging trans-Pacific organized crime; and (ii) 
serve as a reference point for scholars and practitioners whose focus was on security and defence components. 
Although he chronicles the main elements of Chinese progression that are deemed to  be strategically important 
sectors, his survey was confined to the extent and pace of telecommunications penetration in Trinidad and 
Tobago, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Guyana, Suriname and Jamaica; the growing corporate presence of 
Chinese high-tech giants in the Caribbean and Latin America, specifically Huawei and ZTE;  and the space 
architectures being established by China in countries in neighboring South America [12].  In the same context, 
the research focus of the Inter-American Dialogue in respect of China-Latin America and the Caribbean 
relations is skewed towards examining the operation of Chinese policy banks in Latin American countries and is 
contradistinctively sparse in its treatment of port infrastructure development. In a paper developed by Margaret 
Myers, Director of the Asia and Latin America Program of the Inter-American Dialogue and collegiate, Kevin 
Gallagher entitled, “Cautious Capital: Chinese Development Finance in Latin America and the Caribbean,” the 
authors examine what is referred to as “the multilateralization of Chinese finance.”   This refers to a pattern 
whereby Chinese banks have partnered with multilateral banks in Latin America and the Caribbean in co-
financing an array of infrastructural projects in order to mitigate possible reputational damage by applying the 
safeguard policies of respective partner institutions. Save and except for the inclusion of partial data on the 
Dominican Republic, no mention is made of CARICOM jurisdictions, let alone port infrastructure development 
projects [13]. Richard Bernal‟s study, “Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in the Caribbean,‟ (2016) which was 
undertaken under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) addresses issues that are 
germane to the Caribbean experience in relation to China‟s ongoing engagements. Bernal provides a 
comprehensive discourse on the potential for future investment in the region, citing opportunities for the 
expansion of sectors such as agriculture, tourism, manufacturing, mining, infrastructure and fishing. Noting that 
“China has made a strong push for investment in ports across the globe and activities related to shipping and 
shipyards” further references to port infrastructure projects are at best cursory and confined a list of venues 
where the writer discerns port investment, but are which are not necessarily exclusive to the Caribbean:  the 
Bahamas, Bangladesh, Belgium, Djibouti, Greece, Nigeria, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Togo and the United 
States (Los Angeles and Seattle) [14].  Annita Montoute, faculty member and lecturer at the University of the 
West Indies at St. Augustine, Institute of International Relations produced a paper in 2013 entitled “Caribbean-
China Economic Relations: What Are the Implications?”  Montoute‟s enquiry was wide-ranging and 
multidimensional in approach. She considers the interests and motivations of Caribbean Community Member 
States in engaging with China and concludes that the deepening liaison provides expanded options and greater 
confidence and space for governments to manoeuvre in external relations, as well as ease of access to additional 
sources of funding. Her key observations were:: (i) that China provides a counterweight to US and EU 
hegemony; (ii)  that Caribbean trade with China was overwhelmingly in China‟s favor over the ten-year period 
2001 to 2010; (iii)  that development projects in Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, Guyana, Barbados,  
Jamaica, Antigua and Barbuda exposed disparities  such as the employment of Chinese workers in lieu of local 
labor in the construction sector and a mismatch between  investments in the manufacturing sector and 
investments in the services sector; (iv) the steady accumulation of concessional loan funding by host countries 
engaging with China bilaterally; and  (v) a growing trade deficit which was manifestly in China‟s  favor. 
American Scientific Research Journal for Engineering, Technology, and Sciences (ASRJETS) (2020) Volume 64, No  1, pp 144-178 
153 
 
Another key concern raised by Montoute was that engagements with the Chinese would ultimately present 
implications for regional integration and Caribbean foreign policy relations. Her paper was mute on port 
infrastructure development [15]. The U.S. China -Economic and Security Review Commission, which was 
created under congressional authority in October 2000 pursuant to the provisions of the Floyd Spence National 
Defence Act, maintains a watching brief on China‟s engagements in the region and how these impact on 
American interests. Reports of the Commission must contain a minimum of data reflecting an array of strategic 
components such as, but not limited to, the drivers of economic, technical, political, cultural, security, and 
people-to-people relations between China and other countries, regions, and regional institutions as well as the 
economic and security implications of Chinese direct investments and market access challenges emanating 
thereto. Since 2000 the Commission has submitted a range of focus reports to the U.S. Congress. These 
included: “China‟s Military Power Projection and U.S. National Interests,” “A World Class Military: Assessing 
China‟s Global Military Ambitions,” “The U.S. -China “Phase One” Deal: A Backgrounder,” and “China‟s 
Quest for Capital: Motivations, Methods and Implications.” Although the Commission noted in 2014 that 
Chinese companies have been involved in port infrastructure projects in the Caribbean in a likely effort to 
capitalize on the boost that Caribbean ports were expected to garner from the expansion of the Panama Canal 
(the tonnage capacity of which was expected to surge by 2025) there is no indication that the Commission is 
maintaining specific attention on port infrastructure  projects  in the Anglophone Caribbean – notably,  a later 
report by the Commission dated 17 October 2018 itemized major infrastructure projects in Belize, Colombia, 
Ecuador and Costa Rica between 2000 – 2018 but excluded mention of the Caribbean.16].  In an unprecedented 
move, a joint session comprising two congressional committees - the Sub-Committee on Asia and the Pacific 
and the Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs – was convened on September 10, 2015 for a Hearing 
on the topic, “China‟s Advance in Latin America and the Caribbean” [17].  The Congress heard the testimony of 
a panel of four experts on China – Latin America Caribbean relations (including this writer) on China‟s 
impressive inroads into the region politically, diplomatically, economically and militarily and the impact of 
these engagements on U.S. relations with its LAC counterparts. The Caribbean component of the debate relied 
exclusively on the indepth and comparative treatment of the topic in a recently released book entitled, “The 
Twilight of America‟s Omnipresence: China‟s Aggrandizement in a New Era of Multipolarity.” This 
intervention was augmented by a monograph expounding on China- Caribbean trade relations titled, “China-
Caribbean Economic and Trade Relations and Implications for the United States – The Way Ahead” [18].  
Given the dynamism of infrastructural investments at that time across strategic fronts in the region, to wit   - the 
expansion of Panama Canal, the  Hutchison Whampoa project in the Commonwealth of the Bahamas and  the 
planned although questionable construction of the Nicaragua Canal with the capability of  rivalling the Panama 
project- and having regard to the potential  of these  mega projects to shape the strategic environment,  this 
writer‟s testimony included a battery of proposals for the rebalancing of relations between the U.S. and 
Caribbean partners  through soft diplomacy [17]. The groundwork was thus laid for more focused research. 
Lastly and by no means the least, in Fall of 2019 the China | Caribbean Observatory was launched by Sirius 
International Caribbean Defence Contractors Limited, headquartered in Trinidad and Tobago as a rejoinder to 
the dearth of focus on Sino-Caribbean investments in the Anglophone region. The Observatory hosts a curated 
database of initiatives being pursued by China in strategically critical sectors in the region, spanning the period 
2005 to 2019. Specific to this study, it includes a checklist of port infrastructure ventures on a country-by-
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country basis, complemented by project descriptions, costs, funding arrangements, the status of implementation, 
and the extent of involvement of Chinese policy banks and state-controlled corporations in the capitalization of 
ventures. Notwithstanding its nascence, the facility opens possibilities for more targeted research in the future 
on port infrastructure development and related themes. 
7. Limitations of the Study 
Based on the above literature survey, research on port infrastructure development and related investment 
opportunities pursued by China in the Caribbean region would appear to be a relatively parched field that is less 
explored among Western scholars. The dynamism of such projects has not been matched by regional and 
country analyses or systemic studies at firm level. Moreover, it is noteworthy that where such references have 
been traced, they are framed in terms of the realist tradition which espouses (a) that survival and security are or 
should be the most important factors considered in enacting state policy; and (b) that the primary consideration 
in accomplishing policies and goals is anchored in the relative power of nations and states in the international 
arena. However, as the present paper discloses, the catalyst behind the MSRI vis-à-vis port infrastructure 
projects in the Caribbean is primarily economic. The situation spotlights issues such as the significant activity 
assumed by non-state actors in a scenario in which cooperation, and arguably conflict, have the potential of 
erupting from non-military and non-security related types of activity, more specifically put by commercial 
activities in strategic sectors  For this reason, on the one hand, one group of scholars and practitioners find 
themselves grappling to discern points of reinforcement and divergence in the conceptual nexus between 
international politics and economics in seeking to explain non-military activity in the broader sweep of 
international affairs; on the other hand, another camp is pre-occupied with „the security dilemma‟ and disposed 
for the most part by the realist tradition. Is there a middle ground?  Most notable, completely absent in this body 
of learning is a post-colonial perspective that confronts the contested concerns peculiar to former colonies and 
emerging economies that make up the Global South. A second limitation of this study is that China does not 
conform to the present-day conventions of the developed world and the global polity. China‟s passage to 
modernity is sui generis. This study is forced to confront the challenge without necessarily resolving it by 
employing an illustrative study of a particular sector, in a particular region, within a given time frame, and from 
the standpoint of the role of the political economy.  However, this does not resolve the core challenge succinctly 
encapsulated by Martin Jacques who stated: “The problem with evaluating and interpreting China solely or 
mainly in terms of the Western lexicon of experience is that by definition, it excludes all that is specific to China: 
in short, what makes China what it is.” Herein lies a crucial paradox. Neither is the notion of the Caribbean as a 
geopolitical area of analysis lacking in complexities of its own. Despite the relatively small size of most 
countries, a perceptive understanding of the region is vital to this study and becomes apparent in making 
recommendations on the way forward since it must take into account the dispersal of ethnic, linguistic, 
economic and political diversity in the region. The Caribbean consists primarily of liberal democracies in a 
neighborhood shared with what is arguably the last remaining bastion of communism in the world, along with 
an array of territories associated with the United States, the United Kingdom and parts of Western Europe. 
Pervading this milieu is a culture of insularity whereby each jurisdiction – whether it be a small independent 
state, a colonial territory, or the province of an external power - is quick to assert its distinctiveness from the 
others, even within the context of conventional groupings. The situation is made more intricate given the 
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perennial realities of inter-island rivalry, border disputes which have festered for very many years and a host of 
internal political features such as political leadership styles, compounded by deep-seated social stratifications 
based on ethnicity, class and an array of cultural nuances peculiar to each jurisdiction. All of these factors could 
potentially discredit generalizations.  As a consequence, CARICOM has had an unyielding history of failure in 
achieving consensus positions on matters of regional significance, let alone undertaking effective joint action 
and maintaining any semblance of coherence, harmonization and credibility in the face of serious regional 
issues. The dilemma extends to the issue of third states and their role and impact on regional affairs with the 
most recent illustrations being China, and of course, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. No less relevant is 
the fact that the Caribbean Community is located in the subregion in the world with the highest concentration of 
countries that maintain diplomatic ties with the Republic of China in what may be construed as a cold-
shouldering of Beijing‟s One China policy.                          
8. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations 
The dramatic rise in Chinese FDIs has sparked intense political, economic and developmental debates regarding 
active state involvement envisioned in the thesis of state corporatism. The 1998 UNCTAD World Investment 
report analyzed the determinants of outward bound FDIs in general and host country determinants within three 
broad parameters defined by (a) political determinants; (b) business facilitation; and (c) economic factors. These 
indices were commonly adopted by scholars in seeking to explain the international movement of capital.  Other 
models would also be adopted. Illustrative of this, under the industrial organizational approach, Hymen (1976) 
employed an FDI typology of industrial organization in explaining internal production in the context of an 
imperfect market framework. The essence of his theory was that firms operating abroad have to compete with 
domestic firms that are in a decidedly advantageous position in terms of culture, language, and legal systems 
and consumer preferences, in addition to being exposed to a certain level of exchange risk. These advantages 
must be offset by market power i.e. firm-specific or monopolistic advantages such as patent protected superior 
technology, brand names, economies of scale and cheaper sources of finance.  D. Nayak and R.Choudhury noted 
that: [18] Hymen‟s argument was supported by Lemfalussy (1961), Kindleberger (1969), Knickerbocker (1963), 
Dunning (1974), Vaitsos (1974), Cohen (1975) and others. Kindleberger‟s (1969) FDI model on the other hand 
adopted a theoretical framework for monopolistic power. He argued that the greatest chances to reap the 
advantages of an imperfect market lay in earning the monopoly profits. Nonetheless, he failed to describe which 
specific advantages a firm should focus on, whether it be superior technology, managerial expertise, patents etc. 
In contrast, Buckley and Casson (1976) shifted the prevailing focus on internationalization theory from country-
specific criteria towards industrial level and firm level determinants. They framed their argument around (a) the 
measurement of profits; (b) the creation of international markets for the purpose of by-passing intermediate 
products; and (c) the internationalization of markets across the world leading to MNCs.  Knickerbocker‟s (1973) 
oligopolistic theory for explaining FDIs hypothesized that besides the need to increase access to the host country 
market and utilization of host country resources. A third reason for choosing a firm‟s allocation was to match a 
rival‟s move. In other words, firms exhibit imitative behavior to avoid losing their strategic advantage. The 
authors at [18] also noted that by far the most robust and comprehensive theory of FDI was put forward by 
Dunning (Read, 2007) who amalgamated the major market-based models – oligopolistic and internationalization 
theories - and added a third dimension referred to as the location theory to explain why a firm is motivated to 
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operate a foreign subsidy. Location theory addresses the very crucial issue of who produces what goods and 
why, and is used by researchers to understand what factors influence MNC units. Such factors would include the 
policies of host countries, economic fundamentals and the agglomeration of economies that accrue to firms that 
operate in clusters. What became increasingly apparent was that location advantages of different countries play 
a significant role in determining which countries play host to MNCs. According to the authors at [18], Dunning 
iterated the basic principle in the following words: “OLI triad of variables determining FDIs an MNCs activities 
may be likened to a three-legged stool; each leg is supportive of the others, and the stool is only functional if the 
tree legs are evenly balanced,” that is to say ownership advantage, internationalization gains and location 
advantage.” Later adaptations to the foregoing theories pivoted around the contemporary challenges confronting 
developing and emerging economies and the proliferation of third world multinational corporations (TWMNCs). 
The adaptations took account of contemporaneous developments that earlier theories failed to address such as 
the issue of technology transfer. The underlying rationale was that as products became more familiar in foreign 
markets and as the markets for these products became more established, firms acted on the preference for 
establishing subsidiaries abroad. Modifications of the product were then made by either scaling up or scaling 
down in a manner amenable to consumer taste and demands.  In this way, ownership advantages are retained by 
TWMNCs over the MNCs of the developed world based on lower overheads. TWMNCs also acquire a closer 
familiarity with local conditions and are perceived as less threatening to the local political and economic 
environment, making them more welcomed, so to speak. By the same token, it should be noted that of late with 
a powerful country like China, which is increasingly being perceived as dominant in the region, Chinese firms 
risk being perceived as a political and /or economic threat in a host country. As one of the most referenced 
scholars working on FDIs, Dunning proposed three FDI typologies based on the motives behind the investments 
of the prospecting firm. The first type is the market-seeking FDI, also referred to as the horizontal FDI. This 
prototype entails the replication of production facilities in the host country. The second type of FDI is called 
resource-seeking: this design arises when firms invest abroad in order to obtain resources not available in the 
home country such as natural resources, raw materials or labor. In the manufacturing sphere factor-cost 
considerations are of paramount importance in such a scenario. Furthermore, vertical or export-oriented FDIs 
would find themselves relocating parts of the production chain to the host country. The availability of low-cost 
labor is logically a prime factor for export oriented FDIs in the resource sector such as oil and natural gas and a 
feature that is particularly attractive in the host country. The third type of FDI is called efficiency seeking and is 
employed where the firm can gain from the common governance of geographically dispersed activities taking 
advantage of economies of scale and scope. Bernal (2016) adopted an expanded version of Dunning‟s model to 
analyze and explain China‟s FDIs in the Caribbean in parallel with the growth phenomenon of third world 
multinational companies employing a five-category typology comprising the following drivers - raw material 
seeking, market seeking, efficiency seeking, asset seeking and debt recovery. The last driver, debt recovery, 
arises when a country agrees to provide an asset in preference to the repayment of a debt, in cash.  The authors 
at [18] have acknowledged that most of China‟s global FDIs have been in raw material and market seeking and 
to a lesser degree, in efficiency and strategic asset motivation, as argued by Dunning 1981; Dunning, 1993; and 
later Bernal, 2016. The authors at [18] have also argued that Chinese firms identify markets guided by political, 
economic, cultural and other complex aspects, as represented by Quer, Claver and Riender, 2012 and their 
objectives are essentially to gain global sustainable market share and advantage within a short space of time as 
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per Rui and Yip, 2008. Regarding the Caribbean, while the small size of any single country may prove to be a 
deterring factor in FDI determinants and investors would be less likely to be enticed by markets lacking 
economies of scale and scope, they would be inclined to gravitate to the region on the basis of geographical 
considerations since in addition to being endowed with a proliferation of deep-water ports, the region is an ideal 
bridgehead between the Middle and Far East and lucrative markets in North, Central and South America. If 
anything, this spotlights the pivotal role of geography and connectivity.  Insofar as FDI theories go, macro-FDI 
theories have tended to emphasize country-specific factors and are skewed towards trade and international 
economics. Micro-FDI theories on the other hand, as articulated by Dunning and his camp are firm-specific, 
address ownership and internalization benefits, and lean towards industrial economies and market imperfection 
bias. China is a developing country that transitioned at an exponential pace that was virtually unprecedented, 
from a centrally planned system to a market-oriented economy modelled along state monopolistic capitalism, 
and sui generis in every respect. However, the absence of a generally accepted theoretical framework for 
explaining FDIs has led researchers to rely almost exclusively on empirical evidence in explaining the 
emergence of FDIs and their spin-offs such as production and trade flows. For this reason, the present enquiry 
relies on empirical evidence in building the argument and drawing conclusions.  Like Nayak and Choudhoury, 
P. Makoni undertook a chronological survey of FDI theory in her thesis, “An Extensive Exploration of Theories 
of Foreign Direct Investment.” She concluded that there was in fact no single superior theory of foreign direct 
investment that comprehensively explains FDIs; nonetheless since theory provided a grounding for further 
work, the history of classifications addressed in her article could be referenced by scholars for future work [19].  
A second theoretical consideration evolves around the virtual absence of current theorizing on the role of 
Chinese corporations (as distinct and apart from private firms) in promoting and enabling FDIs in respect of 
which institutional theory dominates. What is now needed is a multi-theoretical view that encompasses a 
political-economic approach to address the role of the Chinese government. In the given context, the role of the 
state is evident in that the majority of China‟s OFDIs is conducted by state-owned entities which account for 
approximately 80 % of Chinese cumulative investment stock (UNCTAD, 2013). This level of state dominance 
means that a mixture of political and commercial interests governs Chinese investment decisions. This is a 
crucial component in the discussion if only because state ownership creates a political affiliation of Chinese 
MNEs with their home country and increases the corporation‟s resource dependence on the home country‟s 
institutional constituents. The dependence in turn along with political perceptions and influence fundamentally 
shapes the investment patterns and motives of Chinese state-owned entities. In terms of future research 
prospects, a more fruitful research stream can be opened to examine to what extent Chinese state ownership 
might advance theories of FDI. A third theoretical consideration pivots around the insufficiency of the existing 
strands of Realism and Liberalism to interpret China‟s internationalization efforts, despite the fact that both 
theories offer invaluable insights into possible interpretations of China‟s expansion across regions. Realist 
theory, on the one hand, focusses on the pursuit of power and security in an international anarchic system 
whereby self-interested sovereign states as central actors in the world system compete in a zero-sum 
environment to achieve relative gains. Its proponents like Hans Morgenthau and Kenneth Walz, for example, 
tend to have a pessimistic outlook premised on the selfishness of human nature and the anarchic character of the 
international system. In their estimation, states as the central actors in the international system fail to cooperate. 
Their survival depends on a struggle for power and authority, often leading to conflict. But Realist 
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interpretations tend to rely on historical analogues and fall back on the proverbial Thucydides Trap… it was the 
rise of Athens and the fear that it inspired in Sparta that made war inevitable. Liberalism like Realist theory has 
many strands, the most compelling of which appears to be notions of „interdependence‟ and „democratic peace‟ 
explored by scholars such as Michael Boyle and Andrew Moravcsik. Its protagonists believe more optimistically 
that conflict can be mitigated through cooperation and that states are not necessarily the central actors in world 
politics. Individuals, groups, intergovernmental bodies, and NGOs have an influence on states and this leads to 
absolute gains. The notion of „international institutions,‟ „democratic peace,‟ and „interdependence.‟ 
Interdependence, economic interdependence, is arguably one of the strongest strands of the Liberalist armament. 
The concept which is about “the sensitivity of economic activity between multiple nations in relation to 
economic developments with these nations” as argued by Cooper (1972) is suggestive of a two-way /symbiotic 
relationship that diminishes the possibility of conflict. This is particularly relevant to the China-Caribbean 
interplay whereby trade interaction and the increasing number of FDIs are becoming progressively intertwined. 
Furthermore, China‟s internationalization presents a number of unique features that lack historical antecedents. 
Accordingly, this area also provides opportunities for extending existing theories that seek to explain the 
manifestations of motivations among international actors.                
Part I 
1.  Overview of China‟s Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road Initiative 
In 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping launched the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime 
Silk Road, collectively referred to as One Belt One Road (OBOR), China‟s most ambitious foreign policy 
initiatives in modern time. OBOR is a geopolitical project with a heavy infrastructural dimension [20]. The Silk 
Road Economic Belt is the land-based segment of the project and has a decidedly domestic focus. Its immediate 
aims are to connect China‟s underdeveloped hinterland and rustbelt to the less developed regions of neighboring 
countries. The area includes China‟s north-east and south-west provinces inclusive of restive Xingliang - the 
main source of domestic terrorism in China. The second segment, the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSRI), 
would connect the South-East Asian region to the southern provinces of China through an elaborate network of 
ports and railways. Currently all of China‟s provinces have developed customized OBOR plans in alignment 
with Jinping‟s blueprint. Titled, “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st. 
Century Maritime Silk Road,” the plan was officially disseminated in March 2015 (two years after its initial 
announcement) by the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Commerce and the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In sum, it is a mega transregional initiative with a robust geopolitical thrust which 
is undergirded by economic drivers. The impetus behind OBOR is manifold. First and foremost, at domestic 
level the initiative is intended to spur growth within China‟s under-developed provinces and address the chronic 
issue of industrial surplus capacity which was an offshoot of the government‟s stimulus package that was 
introduced at the height of the 2008 global financial crisis. One of spill-overs from that ill-fated period was mass 
lay-offs precipitating high unemployment levels. All of this was compounded by debt distress resulting from 
unprecedented levels of bad loans in the China‟s banking sector due to excessive overleveraging that 
characterized thousands of state-controlled banks.  Job creation for millions of jobless and displaced Chinese 
nationals is therefore of paramount importance to the Chinese government. Third and equally important, OBOR 
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initiative is meant to spur regional economic integration by speeding up connectivity in peripheral regions and 
beyond. The initiative promises to open six economic corridors encompassing China and Mongolia; Eurasian 
countries; Central and West Asia; Pakistan and other countries of the Indian sub-continent and Indo-China. The 
China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, for example, would connect Kashgar in Xinjing in China‟s far-west to Port 
Gwardar in the Bulachista province. Widened integration would also serve to diminish too great a reliance by 
China on vulnerable transportation choke points such as the Strait of Malacca. On the broader geopolitical front, 
OBOR was also intended to serve as a counterbalance to the now defunct Pivot- to-Asia and the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) which until 2016 was aggressively shepherded by the United States under the Obama-led 
administration. 
8.1 Geopolitical and Geostrategic Considerations 
With the election of President Trump and corresponding reversals in U.S. foreign policy autographed in the 
emergent America First credo (effectively signaling an official retreat from traditional alliances), China took 
advantage of new opportunities to consolidate its epic re-emergence as a trans-continental trade titan and 
promote a new economic global modality extending across the Pacific into the Atlantic. This time-honored 
persistence in geographic economic and trade relationships – from East to West and back to the East - in pursuit 
of vast trade potentialities is fueled by domestic demands for increased trade through strengthened alliances and 
partnerships and a push for interconnectivity requiring supporting infrastructural architectures. While on the one 
hand, some academics suggest that the potential routes for the Maritime Silk Road could contribute to increasing 
tensions between China and some of its existing trade partners (Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines and 
Vietnam) an alternative school of thought is that the initiative could very well provide a means for the resolution 
of long-standing sovereignty-related disputes by providing an opportunity for mutual gain. This underscores the 
strategic components of Chinese engagements with international partners and the high stakes at hand which are 
interwoven into One Belt One Road. [21].  On the face therefore, much of the alarm and negative interpretations 
being ascribed to Chinese penetration in the Asia-Pacific and beyond that into other hemispheres could very 
well be misplaced, as this study will demonstrate. Indeed, the key motivations in China‟s assertive foreign 
policy go beyond strategic calculations informed by geostrategy such as long-term power projections mapped by 
many Western thinkers, to mundane and defensible concerns such as China‟s chronic social issues and domestic 
economic challenges which the body politic has failed to put in check. Despite its relatively modest contribution 
to the Chinese economy, China regards the Latin America and Caribbean market as an important node in its 
global outreach. This point is consistently iterated by President Jinping, high ranking CCP officials and the 
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A thorough analysis of China‟s accelerated gravitation to Caribbean 
jurisdictions, particularly member states of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), necessitates going beyond 
the product dollar value of imports and exports and considering the long-term economic and strategic rationality 
of such engagements. Consider this: in 2018, the Latin America and Caribbean market, excluding Mexico, 
accounted for a mere 6.7 % of China‟s export stock and 4.17 % of its imports with the rest of the world. In 
contrast China‟s principal trade partners remain concentrated among peripheral states in the Far-East which are 
its closest neighbors, namely Japan, South Kora, India, Vietnam and Singapore. The Caribbean in turn has 
certain advantages among which it serves as a gateway to North America and Latin America opening the door to 
lucrative market possibilities. A second consideration is that scholars have argued that the future of the 21st. 
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Century Maritime Silk Road could only be as successful as the economic performance of participating countries. 
This raises the issue of funding. President Jinping pledged USD $113 billion to China‟s New Silk Road Plan on 
the occasion of the formal launch on 14 May 2017 [22]. This sum was to be disbursed through the state-owned 
Silk Road Fund which was inaugurated in 2015 with USD $40 billion in initial capital and two Chinese policy 
banks which are currently highly visible in the Caribbean, namely, the China Development Bank and the Export 
Import Bank of China. Additionally, two multinational institutions led by China would also be contributors – the 
Asia Infrastructural Investment bank with a registered capital of USD 4100 billion and the Shanghai-based New 
Development Bank with a starting capital of USD $50 billion. Notably, China is a donor member of the Inter-
American Development Bank, the Inter-American Investment Corporation which focusses on small to medium 
sized businesses and the IDB Multilateral Investment Fund which promotes poverty reduction programs in 
collaboration with the private sector of Latin America and the Caribbean. These affiliations confirm the 
multidimensional nature and depth of Chinese financing in the hemisphere.                               
8.2 Trade Concentrations and Trade Flows 
This section of the paper examines current trade concentrations and flows in the Caribbean. Table1 shows the 
products that accounted for the highest dollar value of Chinese import purchases and the percentage share of 
China‟s overall imports by US dollar value. In 2018, China‟s most valued exports were electrical machinery 
equipment, mineral fluids including oil, computers, ores, slag and ash, optical, technical and medical apparatus, 
vehicles, plastics and plastic articles, organic chemicals, gems and precious metals and copper. Of these 
imported goods, 59.9% were imported from Asian countries, with the European Union accounting for an 
estimated 17.7% of imported goods, bought from China. Smaller percentages came from suppliers in North 
America (9.3%), Latin America excluding Mexico but including the Caribbean (6.7%), Australia and other 
Oceana sources (5.7%) and Africa (4.6%).  There were import increases in three specific areas only -organic 
chemicals which rose by 20.7% from the previous year, machinery including computers which rose by 19.3% 
and copper with an increase of 15.4%. A similar picture emerges when export trends are examined. Countries of 
East Asia are the primary recipients of Chinese exports.  According to the World Trade Center, China shipped 
$2.294 trillion worth of products around the globe in 2018. The most valuable exports were phone system 
devices including smart phones, computers including optical readers, integrated circuits, computer parts and 
accessories, TV receivers, monitors and projectors, lamps and lighting including illuminated signs, semi-
conductors and various furniture. Its top 10 exports were electrical machinery. Its top ten exports were 
machinery, computers, furniture, plastics and plastic articles, vehicles, knit or crochet clothing accessories, 
clothing, optical, technical and medical apparatus and organic chemicals. Table 2 refers.  Of all the exported 
commodities, organic chemicals comprised the fastest growing, registering a 20.2% gain over the previous year. 
Second in descending order of improved exports were articles made from iron and steel which reflected a 15.6% 
increase followed by plastics as the third fastest growing export products, increasing by 14 % over the previous 
year [23]. Regarding exports 62.3% of products purchased from China were bought by importers from the 
United States (19.2%), Hong Kong (12.1%), Japan (5.9%0, South Korea (4.4%), Vietnam (3.4%), Germany 
(3.1%), India (3.1%), Netherlands (2.9%), United Kingdom (2.3%), Singapore (2%), Taiwan (2%) and Russia 
(1.9%).  Once again, a sizeable share (47.8 percent) of exported goods were delivered to Asian countries 22.4% 
to North American importers, 19.1% to clients in Europe, 4.21% to Africa, 4.17 % to Latin America (excluding 
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Mexico but including the Caribbean), and 2.3% to Oceana led by Australia and New Zealand. Significantly, 
during the same period, Mexico increased its import purchases from China at the fastest rate - up by 22.9%, 
followed by Vietnam (up by 17.3%), India (up by 13%), Russia (up by 12.1%) and the United States (11.5%).  
Table 2: China‟s Top 10 Imports by Product, Value and % of Overall Imports (2018) 
Rank Product Import value in US 
dollars 
% Share of Overall 
Imports 
1 Electrical machinery $521.5 billion 24.4 % 
2 Mineral fuels including 
oil 
$347.8 billion 16.3 % 
3 Machinery including 
computers 
$202.3 billion 9.5% 
4 Ores, slag, ash $135.9 billion 6.4 % 
5 Optical, technical, 
medical apparatus 
$102.5 billion 4.8 % 
6 Vehicles $815 billion 3.8 % 
7 Plastics, plastic articles $74.9 billion 3.5 % 
8 Organic chemicals $67.4 billion 3.2 % 
9 Gems, precious metals $62 billion 2.9 % 
10 Copper $47.6 billion 2.2 % 
        Source: World Top Imports http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-10-exports/ 
Table 3: China‟s Top 10 Exports by Product, Value and % of Overall Imports (2018) 
Rank Product Import value in US 
dollars 
% Share of Overall 
Imports 
1 Electrical machinery 
equipment 
 
$664.4 billion 
 
26.6 % 
2 Machinery including 
apparatus 
 
$430 billion 
 
17.2% 
3 Furniture, lighting signs, 
prefab buildings, 
 
$96.4 billion 
 
3.9 % 
4 Plastics and plastic 
articles 
 
$80.1 billion 
 
3.2 % 
5 Vehicles $75.1 billion 
 
 
6 Knit or crochet clothing, 
accessories 
 
$73.5 billion 
 
2.9 % 
7 Clothing accessories  
$71.4 billion 
 
2.9 % 
8 Optical, technical and 
medical apparatus 
 
$71.4 billion 
 
2.9 % 
9 Articles of ion or steel $65.6 billion 2.6 % 
10 Organic chemicals $59.8 billion 2.4 % 
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                  Source: World‟s Top Exports http://www.worldstopexports.com/chinas-top-10-exports/ 
8.3 Distinctions between Caribbean Economies 
Trade facilitation, which involves the free movement of goods from one point to another, from one country to 
another, and in this context from one hemisphere to another, necessitates a composite of unique transportation 
arrangements that comprise the supply chain, and encompasses complex logistics. This was the central idea 
promoted by Pinnock and Ajagumma in their 2012 paper entitled, “Maritime Highway Corridors into the 
Caribbean Seas” [24]. The authors noted that trade facilitation encompasses but is not limited to customs 
modernization, the promotion of electronic processing of trade documents, improvement access to trade and 
transport information for the purpose of tracking, tracing, processing and approval, and the cultivation of local 
logistics competence in forwarding, tracking and freight consolidation.  Another crucial point made by the 
authors in [24] is that given the common maritime space afforded by the Caribbean Sea, the heavy reliance on 
maritime transportation and port infrastructure and capitalization on geographic circumstances, is inevitable.  A 
critical component of trade facilitation within the framework of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road is building 
enormous amounts of infrastructure systems such as air and sea ports, telecommunications, roadways, industrial 
parks and power grids to enhance connectivity. One of the major challenges presently confronting Caribbean 
nations is how to connect efficiently to global supply chains and how to maximize opportunities for 
transshipment hubs given the high demands placed on infrastructural requisites.  A second major challenge is 
that despite the heavy reliance of most Caribbean states on tourism and offshore banking as the primary drivers 
of economic activity, countries still remain disproportionately dependent on imports from North America, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Europe compared with considerably lower volumes of inter- and intra-regional 
trade flows. The ocean as a vector for moving commodities is thus inescapable. An examination of key indices 
of trade performance in CARICOM economies, namely growth trends, public debt, fiscal performance, trade 
concentration and constraints to competitiveness lends clarity to the basis for China‟s prioritization of port 
infrastructural development in this part of the hemisphere. In terms of general growth trends, Caribbean 
economies grew by an average of 2.4 percent over the period 2000-2012 while subregional economies grew at 
an even slower rate of 1.1 percent in 2010 and 2 percent in 2013. An array of bilateral trade agreements, free 
trade agreements, and partial scope agreements that embraced trade liberalization and openness of economies 
failed to deliver on their intended results. To the contrary, the region continued to account for a mere marginal 
share of global (0.06 %) (1.2 %) and regional trade in 2013 [25]. Additionally, most CARICOM members have 
registered current account deficits over the same period. The overall regional average stood at 16.2 percent of 
GDP whilst that of the Eastern Caribbean States was 16.8 percent (Mc Lean and his colleagues 2014).   The 
second component of trade performance evolves around public debt. CARICOM member states are constrained 
by high levels of public debt, with countries like Barbados, Jamaica and St. Kitts and Nevis all having public 
debt-to-GDP ratios at unsustainable levels exceeding 100 percent [ 26].  In the case of Belize, Grenada and St. 
Kitts and Nevis, attempts were made in 2012 to restructure portions of these countries‟ debt levels, but there is 
evidence that while some economies may have engaged in debt restructuring initiatives and reduced the face 
value of their debt, in many instances the debt stock has not contracted since maturities were simply lengthened 
and interest rates reduced (United Nations, 2014).  The third component of trade performance concerns fiscal 
consolidation. The authors in [25, 26] underscore that Governments of the more indebted CARICOM economies 
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instituted a raft of fiscal consolidation measures following the 2008 global financial crisis, which when coupled 
with debt consolidation commitments, resulted in the limited availability of resources for investment purposes, 
in building export capacity, increasing trade competitiveness and in fostering private sector development. A 
fourth and equally pertinent component of trade performance relates to trade concentration and the nature of 
commodities exported from CARICOM both intra- and extra-regionally. Employing the Herfindahl- Hirchmann 
Index the authors in [25] note that the production and export of Caribbean goods is more specialized in fewer 
products when compared with the world average, and with that of Small Island Developing States, in general. In 
the case of the Caribbean Community, the three top trade products accounting for 40 % to 90 % of the total 
products traded. Additionally, the top ten products account for 75 % of the region‟s exports. This implies that 
the region‟s goods exports are precariously built around a few primary products making the economies 
particularly vulnerable to external shocks such as commodity price changes. What is equally notable is that few 
CARICOM economies can be classified as good producers: Belize (sugar, citrus, bananas, petroleum); Guyana 
(sugar, rice, bauxite, gold, alumina); Jamaica (aluminum and bauxite); and in the case of Trinidad and Tobago 
(oil, chemicals and natural gas). The service sector, on the other hand dominates most of the smaller and larger 
number of economies and accounts for over 70 % of their economic output: Bahamas (76.5 %); Barbados (81.7 
%); Dominica (70.7 %); St. Kitts and Nevis (74.2 %); St. Lucia (73.2 %); St. Vincent and the Grenadines (73.5 
%); and the OECS (75.6 %).  The fifth component in relation to trade performance, iterated by the authors of 
[25] (which is a in effect a subset of the fourth component) is the fact that CARICOM export commodities are 
disproportionately dominated by extra-regional markets in North America and Europe including the United 
Kingdom, while intraregional exports account for a mere 15 % of the total and amounts to 25.7 % if Latin 
America were included. This implies that exports from Latin America comprise a sizeable proportion in 
CARICOM trade flows although as a whole trade with the more developed countries dominates the region. As a 
consequence of the aforementioned factors, trade agreements whether they be bilateral, free trade or partial 
scope along with the lack comparative advantages have failed to create the demand pull necessary for broad-
based rationalization of resource allocation, for the diversification of production and for the expansion of goods 
exports. Not surprisingly, a key conclusion emerging from the 2015 ECLAC-commissioned study authored by 
Mc Lean and Khadan was: “It would appear that inherent structural gaps particularly in the areas of quality 
infrastructure, interconnectivity, productivity, and competitiveness have limited the ability of Caribbean 
economies to transform domestic production systems and increase trade competitiveness”  It should also be 
noted that during the post financial crisis period after 2008, when some of the region‟s more indebted economies 
began a phase of fiscal consolidation which when coupled with debt repayments, this course of action actually 
limited the quantity of resources available for investment and building export capacity, increasing trade 
competitiveness and fostering private sector development. Compounding this intractable state of affairs, is the 
dispersed nature of Caribbean economies with each country pursuing its own national priorities, cross-country 
differences in population size, politics and demographics, the small-scale nature of production which inhibits 
economies of scale, disproportional reliance on external markets and vulnerability to natural disasters, all of 
which inhibit trade competitiveness [27].  In combination, these hamper any potential gains of regional 
economic integration (Duncan, Mc Lean and his colleagues UNELAC, 2014).  
8.4 Economic agglomeration and Institutional Alignments 
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China views these systemic deficiencies as opportunities for economic agglomeration which it proactively 
pursues by engaging with governments at bilateral and multilateral levels. Thus, mechanisms such as the China-
CELAC Forum and the Joint Plan of Action for Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021), which was signed 
in Santiago, Chile, in January 2018 on the occasion of the Second China- CELAC Meeting of Ministers, brings 
into alignment the collective goals of CARICOM members with China‟s long-term vision under a shared 
platform of mutually reinforcing priority areas [28]. In the same vein, the Joint Plan of Action incorporates the 
United Nations Millenium Goals for Sustainable Development 2030, and in so doing, effectively promotes 
intercontinental dialogue. Goal No. 9 of the United Nations 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development is 
anchored is the reality that efficient transport services are key drivers of economic development and more than 
80 % of the world‟s merchandize trade by volume is transported by sea [29].  In addition to these institutional 
alignments, China is a donor member of the Inter-American Development Bank through which it provides 
multi-donor funding for building institutional capacity in Caribbean countries [30].  China also makes financial 
endowments to the Organization of American States and has set up a China - Latin America Caribbean 
Cooperation Fund consisting of a Co-Financing Fund and a Private Equity Fund. The latter is administered by 
the Export-Import Bank of China. Thereto, China has been able to facilitate economic agglomeration through 
the channels of multilateralism, institutionalized dialogue and soft diplomacy while co-opting state-controlled 
(Chinese) corporations at home. 
Part II 
The Caribbean as a Major Maritime Transshipment Corridor 
We will improve the bilateral and multilateral cooperation mechanisms of the Belt and Road Initiative focusing 
on policy communication, infrastructure connectivity, trade facilitation, capital flow and people-to-people 
exchanges…We will advance the development of multi-model transportation that integrates expressways, 
railways, waterways and airways, build international logistics thoroughfares, and strengthen infrastructure 
development along major routes and major ports of entry… (Xi, J., 2017 a)  The preceding section illustrates the 
extent to which Caribbean Community Member States are heavily reliant on imports from North America and 
the Far East in spite of the disproportionately small import parcel sizes at subregional level when compared with 
world trends. In this scenario, Caribbean economies do not provide a large enough economic base to support the 
development of modern port facilities commensurate with international standards. As a consequence, the present 
imperative demands substantial long-term investments and loan funding. This section demonstrates the all-
important need to address systemic infrastructural gaps having regard to the logistical demands of trade and 
commerce in a maritime context that is unique to the region. The Caribbean is home to an estimated 351 ports, 
15 oil refineries, and 51 tank terminals. Approximately 16 types of ships transit the area which is assuming 
increasing significance by virtue of its maritime relevance. The ports can be divided into three main groups: 
 Specialized ports which cater for one type of cargo such as sugar, oil, natural gas or bananas and are 
invariably privately owned; 
 Public ports which are open for all types of cargoes which are typically break bulk and containers; 
 Transshipment centers which are specialized ports or terminals that handle mainly containers and 
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which do not enter or originate from the country itself. 
Complementary to these ports are supporting shipping services: (i) inter-island transport; (ii) short sea shipping; 
(iii) deep sea shipping; (iv) shipments of non-regional cargo which transit the region taking full advantage of the 
intermediary setting along the principal Est-West global trade routes that pass through the Panama Canal and the 
North- South routes between North America and South America. Lately, the concept of containerization has 
become a crucial issue since many of the small ports in the region were initially designed to support colonial 
economic sources of bulk importation of basic items and the exportation of commodities such as bananas and 
sugar. With technological advancements, and corresponding increases in the sizes of container ships and in 
levels of specialization, new demands have been placed on general cargo port configuration for larger storage 
areas and for pier-side handing infrastructure, commensurate with container traffic. In recognition of this 
development some countries, as for example the Bahamas and Jamaica although not exclusively so, have 
invested substantially in cargo ports in comparison to others depending on their geographic location and whether 
they serve the interests of global transshipment hubs, sub-regional hubs, or service ports which cater primarily 
for domestic needs, as displayed in Table 4.  Currently, there are six competing global transshipment hubs in the 
greater region, two of which are located in Caribbean Community Member States - Kingston in Jamaica, and 
Freeport in the Bahamas.  The remaining ports are hosted among four non-CARICOM countries. These are 
Manzanillo and Colon in Panama, Caucedo in the Dominican Republic, Cartagena in Colombia and notionally, 
Marel in Cuba. China already has substantial interests in the Bahamas, Jamaica and Panama which are key 
trans-Atlantic choke points and significant nodes in the 21
st
 Century Maritime Silk Road initiative. See Table 5. 
Another distinctive feature of the regional maritime environment are the geopolitical ramifications that go hand 
in hand with the coveted designation of „global hub‟ port, which has been earned by all but few of the region‟s 
ports. Historically, the use of transshipment hubs in the Caribbean has been employed as a strategic tool to 
circumvent restrictions imposed on ships bound for the U.S. under U.S. shipping codes specifically the United 
States Merchant Marine Act of 1920, commonly referred to as the Jones Act. The Act‟s cabotage provisions, at 
the heart of which is the issue of national defence, regulate maritime commerce in U.S. waters and between U.S. 
ports. The provisions stipulate that all goods transported by water between U.S. ports must be carried by U.S. 
flag ships, constructed in the U.S., and owned and crewed by U.S. citizens. Given this restraint, cargoes bound 
for the United States are typically transported to a central location outside of U.S. waters on main liners, and 
thereafter, re-parceled into feeder vessels and distributed through the U.S. port system. Pinnock and Ajugunna 
underscore these points in addition to which two other factors are important in this respect. The first is that over 
ninety percent of global container liner tonnage is registered with flags of convenience to circumvent restrictive 
local laws. The second is that the Bahamas is the third leading flag state in the world with a total value in 2018 
of $79,551 million in registered vessels superseding Norway and the United States while Kingston Harbor in 
Jamaica is the seventh largest natural harbor in the world and the seventh busiest port in the Americas. Table 4 
refers. 
Key Trade Drivers 
Preceding sections of this study establish that not only is the Caribbean is providentially located within the 
geographic approaches to the U.S. homeland but is placed within the cusp of elaborate transshipment networks, 
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and that no single port in the region is invested with the capacity to serve the entire area.  Not unexpectedly, 
China sees the region‟s dense network of global linkages fostered by the advantage of being at the crossroads of 
East-West and North-South maritime routes and trade flows as a primary trade driver and an opportunity for 
establishing transshipment hubs that support the MSRI. This is a primary trade driver; but there are other 
equally notable ones. The second trade driver relates to the impact of extensive expansion work on the Panama 
Canal – a major gateway for cargo moving from the Far East to U.S. east coast ports. This development has 
increased demands placed on the capacity of inbound and outbound trade flows for subregional ports, on 
interconnectivities between ports, on trans-Atlantic and south-south trade flows and competitive access to the 
U.S. east coast. 
Table 4:  Global Transshipment Hub Port, Sub-Regional Service Ports and Service Ports in the Caribbean as 
Classified by Industry Experts 
     
     Ports  
 
   Countries 
 
 Global Hub 
 
Sub-Regional Hub 
 
 Service Ports 
 
Kingston Container 
Terminal 
 
Jamaica 
 
         * 
  
Free Port Bahamas          *   
Manzillo Panama          *   
Colon Panama          *   
Caucedo Dominican 
Republic 
      
         * 
  
Cartegena Colombia          *   
Port of Spain Trinidad              *  
Point Lisas Trinidad              *  
Kingston Wharves  
Jamaica 
  
            * 
 
Bridgetown Barbados               * 
Rio Haina Dominican 
Republic  
   
            * 
Puerto Plata Dominican 
Republic 
   
            * 
La -Roman Dominican 
Republic  
              * 
Boca-Chica Dominican 
Republic 
              * 
Georgetown Cayman               * 
St. John Antigua               * 
Castries St. Lucia                 * 
Vieux Fort St. Lucia                 * 
Georgetown Guyana                 * 
Havana Cuba                 * 
Willemstad Curacao                 * 
Point-A-Pitre Guadeloupe                 * 
Source: Developed by Pinnock and Ajugunna 2012. Article, “Maritime Highway Corridors into the Caribbean 
Seas.”  https://www.faq-logistique.com/EMS-Livre-Corridors-Transport-19-Maritime-Highway-Carribean-Seas-
Panama-Canal.htm/ Accessed 26 December 2019.  
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Table 5: Caribbean Competing Global Transshipment Hubs 
 
 
Location 
 
Gantry 
Cranes 
 
Terminal 
Area 
 
Berth (M) 
 
Depth (M) 
 
Current 
Capacity 
(TEUs)  
 
Planned 
Capacity 
 
Global Port 
Operator 
Interest  
Kingston, 
Jamaica 
19 185 2,455 14.5 2,8000,000 5,800,000 Self 
Freeport, 
Bahamas 
10 49 1,036 16 1,500,000 3,5000,000 Hutchison 
Whampoa 
Ltd.  
Manzanillo, 
Panama 
14 52 1,940 14 1,3000,000 4,000,000 Self 
Colon, 
Panama 
10 74 982 15 400,000 1,3000,000 Evergreen 
Group 
Caucedo, 
Dominican 
Republic 
7 50 922 13.5 1,250,000    - Dubai Port 
Cartagena, 
Colombia 
6 96 1,200 11.8 1,200,000 3,200,000 Self 
Mariel, 
Cuba 
-Projected  
6 Not 
Available 
700 15    - 850,000 PSA 
International 
Source: Developed by Pinnock and Ajugunna, 2012. Article, “Maritime Highway Corridors into the Caribbean 
Seas.” https://www.faq-logistique.com/EMS-Livre-Corridors-Transport-19-Maritime-Highway-Carribean-Seas-
Panama-Canal.htm/ . 
The third trade driver is Latin America‟s booming trade with China, most notably, as the chief commercial 
partner of Brazil, Chile and Peru and the second largest for Argentina, Colombia and Uruguay in commodities 
such as whole grain soy imports, minerals and oil. In response to this uptick, traditional service ports in the 
Caribbean that historically operated at subsistence levels are compelled to upgrade their facilities in order to 
remain viable and competitive in this fiercely competitive market.   The reality of having three layers of 
transshipment networks supporting global, sub-regional and service port needs, respectively, and maintaining a 
dense network of shipping linkages places additional strains on the shipping corridors, underscoring related 
demands on connectivity and even explaining the increasing visibility of technology giants like Huawei which 
has establishing a decisive footprint in the region. Although the latter falls beyond the scope of this study, 
telecommunications and information technology do in fact underpin transportation and logistics. Moreover, port 
development projects in the Caribbean Community which are varied in type and in scale are promoted | 
monopolized by two main companies, the China Harbor Engineering Company and the China -EXIM Bank. 
Both companies are involved in interconnected projects and supported by clusters of interconnected firms, as 
illustrated in major work in the Bahamas (North Abaco) and Jamaica, respectively. A number of similar projects 
in the wider region are at various stages of evolution ranging from conceptualization, to technical and financial 
feasibility studies, to fully blown implementation. All in all, port community investment in CARICOM 
countries is proving to be a catalyst for outbound direct foreign investment of Chinese policy banks and Chinese 
corporations, many of which are state-owned or state-controlled. 
Projections for Future Establishment of ‘Global Hubs’ 
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This section of the study attempts to make future projections based on two pillars: commissioned surveys and 
recommendations made by multilateral bodies and ongoing state policies of regional governments. For 
illustrative purposes, four of the larger regional economies are spotlighted of which two are service oriented and 
two commodity-based: Bahamas, Jamaica, the Cooperative Republic of Guyana and the Republic Trinidad and 
Tobago.  In the Caribbean, the key drivers of marine transshipment that will inform the future location of deep-
water ports, particularly the “global hub port,” category are the following:  
 Proximity to the crossroads of main maritime highways; 
 The productivity of stevedoring operations;  
 The guarantee of berths; 
 The competitiveness of tariffs; 
 The control of operations in tandem with safety and security; 
 The operation of dedicated feeder services;  
 The robustness of supporting information and telecommunication systems; and 
  The potential for import/export and other aspects of related development in the peripheral areas of port 
estates.  
A 2019 IDB report describing the challenges confronted in select countries of the Caribbean Community in the 
development of infrastructure based on the Borensztein and his colleagues (2014) development gap 
methodology in the spheres of environment energy, water and sanitation, technology, energy, and transportation, 
revealed that there existed substantial deficits in the port facilities and roadway networks of Bahamas, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana and Suriname, respectively. The report underscored the region-wide need for the 
modernization and upgrade of facilities to world standards. In the case of the Bahamas, a small open 
archipelagic economy with an estimated per capita GDP of US $30,500  which relies on sea and air transport to 
connect people and local economies, the report noted that shipping  to the more remote south-west islands 
remained the biggest challenge for the government since many port and shipping facilities remained outdated, 
inefficient and fragmented, in dire need of modernization and connectivity, while ICT standards remained below  
expectations  ranking 22nd in LAC  mobile and telephone penetration  only above Ecuador, Haiti, Guyana and 
Belize [31]. With respect to Jamaica, a small middle-income jurisdiction with a GDP of US $4,750 at the end of 
2017, IDB noted fiscal constraints had led to insufficient road maintenance and significant deterioration in 
Jamaica‟s road quality. Logistics performance at ports was described as weak as were other areas such as goods 
clearance processes at ports and seaports and the automation of document processing due to the absence of a 
single trade window. The picture emerging from transshipment was more encouraging. While on the one hand, 
the performance of ports in this area of operation was described as strong and improving, on the other there 
were limited investments in infrastructure to support the development of value-added logistics services [32]. The 
Cooperative Republic of Guyana, with a GDP per capita of US $4,580 and whose economy based on IMF 
calculations is expected to grow at an annual rate of 19 percent between 2019-2023, possesses one of the 
sparsest road networks in South America. As a consequence, Guyana‟s transportation challenges have adversely 
impacted on trade connectivity. The IDB report noted that 80% of Guyana‟s road network remains largely 
unpaved and the country lacks a transshipment corridor connecting it to Brazil. Also absent is a crucial bridge 
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connecting the major coastal highways of Guyana and neighboring Suriname as well as vital investments in 
bridges that spanning the country‟s extensive river system. The report found that improvements to the port 
system to bring it up to international standards would reduce the cost of transport and complement the proposed 
development of a transportation corridor with Brazil. A broader study on the feasibility of constructing a deep-
water port on Guyana‟s coast has been in progress for some years. This enquiry notes that construction of a 
proposed deep-water port in Berbice augmented by a 90-meter wharf and 10,000-meter logistics yard would 
serve a dual purpose conducive to trade facilitation by (a) providing a hub for the Guyanese bauxite, rice and 
sugar industries; and (b) servicing the country‟s burgeoning oil and gas exploration sectors which have recently 
emerged as the bulwark of the economy [33]. Regarding Trinidad and Tobago, a high-income economy by 
World Bank accounts which ranks among the wealthiest in the Caribbean, government infrastructure investment 
decreased substantially in recent years. Between 2016 -2018 infrastructure investment „proxied by the net 
acquisition of non-financial assets,‟ averaging 2.4 percent of GDP, down from 4.50 percent of GDP between 
2010-2015. In consequence, infrastructure warranted urgent improvements to support productivity and 
commensurate growth and the achievement of long-term development goals. Of 138 countries assessed in the 
2017-2018 Global Competitiveness Report Infrastructure Index, Trinidad and Tobago ranked 59
th
 and despite 
significant capital expenditure in this area, substantial constraints were identified in relation to maritime 
transportation at the two major ports in the capital city of Port of Spain and in industrialized Point Lisas estate. 
The following infrastructural deficits were particularly striking: (a)  that the major transportation  port in the 
capital city has an 11 meter draft that restricts the size of vessels entering and the time they may enter; (b) that 
the largest vessels  (Panamax) could only enter once every 24 hours; (c) that there is an insufficient number of 
cranes, and further, low productivity of the existing ones contribute to the fact that  handling time which was 
found to be  more than triple  that of more efficient ports; and (d) the main transnational port‟s location in the 
capital placed  limits on the land space available  for the storage of containers and contributed to traffic 
congestion in the commercial environs. All of the foregoing is compounded by a roadway network with the 
highest level of motorization in the Caribbean, a large portion of which is in poor condition with freeways that 
are narrow and poorly aligned compounded by bottlenecks at key intersections. The report noted that substantial 
shortcomings and inefficiencies of the country‟s transport system was costing users an estimated US $367 - 
$245 million annually in lost time, reliability and fuel (Inter-American Development Bank, 2016). Its prognosis 
was that infrastructure rehabilitation and modernization in Trinidad and Tobago begged urgent attention.  In 
addition to ongoing work on major interchanges, Trinidad and Tobago‟s government has proposed the 
development of a dry dock facility in the southern part of the main island which will potentially increase the size 
and number of shipping vessels visiting the country and allow the movement of larger vessels from Panama 
Canal‟s expanded facility, thereby positioning the country as a hub for cargo shipments [34]. 
Response of Caribbean Governments to Port Infrastructure Imperatives 
The Caribbean is undisputedly a vital economic corridor in the Western Hemisphere and its share of global 
cargo is increasing. The Chinese focus on trade facilitation and connectivity is reflected in a number of already 
mentioned documents that transpose and shed light on its current regional engagements. The principal examples 
are China‟s National Plan on Implementation of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the 13th Five 
Year Plan of the People‟s Republic of China (P.R.C. 2016), the CELAC – China Joint Plan of Action on 
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Cooperation on Priority Areas (2019-2021) which was adopted in January 2018 in Santiago, Chile, and the 
United Nations Sustainable Development Goals 2030 Agenda (specifically Goal No. 9). Port infrastructure 
development has been officially incorporated into the long-term development plans of Caribbean Community 
member. Jamaica‟s Vision 2030 National Development Plan (March 2015) [35], Trinidad and Tobago‟s Vision 
2030 [36] and Guyana‟s Green State Development Strategy Vision 2040 [36] all envisage substantial 
infrastructural upgrades as part of their respective national long-term developmental goals. So too do Grenada‟s 
National Sustainable Development Plan 2035 [37]; Antigua and Barbuda‟s 2016 – 2020 Medium Term Strategic 
Development Plan as a subset of „Industry, Innovation and Infrastructure [38];‟ Barbados‟s Growth and 
Development Strategy 2013-2020 and National Strategic Plan 2006 - 2025: Global Excellence, Barbadian 
Traditions [39]; the St. Vincent and the Grenadines‟ National Economic and Social Development Plan 2013 – 
2025 which incorporates  a guide to optimal improvement  in the country‟s infrastructural and environmental 
sectors [40]; Suriname‟s Policy Development Plan 2017 – 2021 which identifies „physical infrastructure‟ as a 
primary pillar under Development Capacity Goals [41]; and Dominica‟s National Resilience Development 
Strategy 2030 which commits to rehabilitating the country‟s cruise ship berth, ferry terminals and the 
Woodbridge Bay deep water cargo port inclusive of adjacent cargo sheds and the commissioning of a study on 
the adequacy of the country‟s existing port infrastructure [42]. Jamaica has been particularly proactive port 
community development and much focus has been placed on the Port of Kingston, the country‟s main port. 
According to the Jamaica Port Handbook (2007-8) , port upgrades have included: (a) investing  in a new West 
Terminal to complement the North and South Terminals in order to boost handling capacity from  1.7 million 
teu to 3.2 million teu; (b) bolstering maritime support services in the immediate environs of port institutions – 
the Newport West and Port Bustamante -  which are home to an array  of cargo handlers, container repair 
companies, handlers, logistics providers,  stevedores and other specialist companies; (c) developing a 
complementary  network of free zones, namely the Kingston Free Zone, the Jamaica International Free Zone, 
the Portmore Informatics Park and the Montego Bay Free Zone; and  (d) expansion of berthing to handle large 
container ships and state-of-the-art mobile cranes. Nonetheless, this transpired ten years prior to the 
aforementioned IDB report on port infrastructure. What‟s more, the Government commissioned the 
establishment of a Global Auto-Logistics Facility which would position the country to be the fourth global 
logistics commodity point in the world with comparable standing to Singapore, Dubai, and Rotterdam. 
Additionally, Kingston Wharves Limited, (KWL) a terminal facility strategically located on the port of Kingston 
and one of the Caribbean‟s leading multipurpose terminal operators, collaborated with the Caribbean Maritime 
University in order to ramp up its logistics capabilities in a move that is expected to increase the port‟s annual 
traffic and give it a share in the global logistics trade which is expected to exceed $16, 400 billion by 2026. An 
initial framework agreement for the proposed development of the Portland Blight/Goat Island between the 
Government and China Harbor Engineering Company Limited was intended to create a $1 billion deep water 
transshipment port with access channels and industrial park with associated operations in storage, assembling 
and packaging of goods in light industries, manufacturing, information technology and skills training. The 
proposed container terminal would also have facilitated berthing of sufficient width, length and depth to 
accommodate Super Post Panamax vessels.  However, the project was scrapped by the Government in 2016 
based environmental considerations pointed out in studies conducted by several companies in the United 
Kingdom and the United States paving the way for cheaper and less environmentally damaging alternatives. 
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Regarding the Bahamas, Hutchison Ports is known to have had a sustained and checkered history in that 
country. The Chinese conglomerate touched soil for the first time in Grand Bahama in 1996 for the purpose of 
conduct a feasibility study and found the location ideal for use as a transshipment terminal. Having made that 
first investment, the company went on to invest in a harbor, an airport (Devco) and the island‟s largest real 
estate property, the Grand Lucayan. Situated 65 miles from Florida, the Freeport Container Port is the natural 
transshipment hub for the Eastern seaboard of the Americas and the principal East-West Line haul routes 
through the region. Hutchison was allowed to construct and operate the container port and eventually became a 
major shareholder holding with a 50 percent interest in Freeport Harbor in exchange for financing the 
prohibitive costs incurred in the dredging and enlarging Freeport Harbor to a much greater depth to facilitate the 
larger container ships utilizing the Panama Canal. Another concession accorded to Hutchison by the Bahamian 
government besides the fifty percent interest was its Exclusivity in a proposed the cruise ship terminal on the 
island (“the Carnival Project”) and from time to time, when requested by the Government, further waivers to 
facilitate other developments on Grand Bahama. A later waiver was granted when the government agreed that 
no real property tax or taxes on capital gains would be levied or imposed in respect of real property owned by 
Hutchison, the Grand Bahama Company Limited or the Freeport Development Company Limited for twenty 
years commencing 04 May 2016.  Today, Hutchison Ports is the port and related services division of CK 
Hutchison Holdings Limited, the world‟s leading port investor, developer, and operator with an impressive 
network of port operations in 52 ports spanning 27 countries throughout Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, 
the Americas and Australasia. The conglomerate has expanded its operations into other logistics and 
transportation-related businesses including cruise ship terminals, airport operations, distribution centers, rail 
services and ship repair facilities. In 2018, Hutchison Whampoa handled a combined tonnage of 84.6 million 
TEU. All of the foregoing features underscore the deepening of Chinese penetration and interconnectivity in the 
Caribbean.                                            
9. Results  
First and foremost, this study provides compelling bases of the extent to which the MSRI holds transformative 
potential for Caribbean Community nations and the fact that it is mutually reinforcing to both sides despite 
manifest asymmetries between the two polities. What‟s more, the study demonstrates that China has 
successfully marshalled the commitment of some of the most relevant geopolitical blocs in the region, CELAC 
and the 15-member Caribbean Community, by ingeniously interweaving its economic development agenda and 
political and cultural long-term goals into sustainable development goals of the Caribbean at regional and 
national levels.  In so doing, China has moved up the added value chain commercially speaking, created reliable 
access to key resources, established its presence in strategically important sectors whilst improving its 
technological prowess and competitiveness in this part of the world. The grand scheme entailed foreign policy 
activism propelled by push factors discussed in this paper, geographical providence and economic necessity.  
Furthermore, the study discloses the marriage of developmental pathways between China and the Caribbean and 
the fact that it is proceeding apace despite region-wide systemic weaknesses – low growth rates, elevated debt 
levels, declines in international reserves and infrastructural gaps which have been identified in various studies. 
Because success of the Chinese model for development assistance is contingent to the economic performance 
and global competitiveness of host countries (Blanchard, 2017), given China‟s „going global‟ push (zou chuqu), 
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there are high stakes involved in investing heavily in areas considered vital to trans and intra-regional 
transportation and connectivity. Left unaddressed, port infrastructure development would assuredly constrain the 
global competitiveness of China and the Caribbean Community alike. If anything, this explains the high priority 
assigned to this area of development cooperation by the region‟s political elite and the shoring in of similar 
ventures at key locations on the American continent such as Panama (the Colon Terminal), Mexico (the 
Manzanillo Container Terminal) and Brazil (terminal acquisitions at Santos Port by Chinese shipping magnate 
COFCO).  Additionally, the signing of MOUs for the One Belt One Road initiative by eight of the fifteen 
Member States comprising the Caribbean Community within an 18-month period (2018 -2019) in which parties 
committed to cooperation in infrastructure development represented a game changer that cemented already 
existing ties between the Asian giant and the Caribbean Community.  A third outcome of this study is its 
exposure of the mutually reinforcing character of the Chinese business model – to wit, a proclivity to assigning 
high priority to growth poles through the geopolitical co-location of mega projects, achieving a level of  high 
speed implementation that is untypical of Western multilateral institutions ( e.g. World Bank) and a preference 
for pursuing a coordinated set of projects involving clusters of interconnected firms thereby nurturing local 
markets, crowding additional investment and catalyzing economic agglomeration (Chin and Gallaher, 2019; 
Dreher and his colleagues 2019). Thus, port infrastructure  mega projects in the Region incorporate the full 
gamut of port support services – a concept commonly referred to as „the three pillars „of  the maritime transport 
sector: the first pillar,  blue water services which incorporates freight and passenger transportation; the second 
pillar, auxiliary services such as agency, cargo handling services, storage, multimodal transport, warehousing 
and freight transport agency services; and the third pillar, services of a non-discriminatory nature typical of ports 
as for example pilotage, lighterage and repair and bunker services. The framework | modus operandi is 
employed by the Chinese in other regions of the world and is discernible in China‟s ground plans in the 
Caribbean.  Such initiatives are likely to continue over the medium to long-term given the fact that this area of 
infrastructure development has been under-capitalized over a prolonged period of time and is region-wide in 
scale. Fourthly, from a scholastic standpoint, the study opens interesting avenues for expanded theory and more 
extensive research in relation to the dominant role of the state in outbound overseas investments and the closely 
related topic of corporate governance of State-Owned Enterprises. 
10. Conclusions 
This study concludes that the 21
st
 Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative provides an impetus for China to 
pursue port infrastructure development throughout the Caribbean in order to advance the long-term economic 
goals of the Chinese government. Central to the study is the fact that MSRI is aligned with the economic goals 
and infrastructural imperatives of Caribbean Community Member States which rely overwhelmingly on port 
services and the regional maritime domain as vectors for intra- and extra-regional trade, and by extension, 
economic survivability in a fiercely competitive global market. MSRI, by virtue of its organizing principles 
considered in this study, is therefore mutually beneficial to China and the Caribbean. Moreover, it is safe to 
conclude that it supersedes other options that may be pursued through traditional multilateral Western 
institutions for the time being. 
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11.  Recommendations 
The recommendations hereunder are based on the following key considerations that emerged from this study: 
 That maritime transportation is relevant to Caribbean countries, and more particularly, to small island 
states which are heavily reliant on trade among themselves and with the rest of the world and almost 
exclusively on maritime shipping; 
 That unit costs of maritime transport tend to be higher in the Caribbean that in other parts of the world 
based on a number of factors including comparative disadvantages related to the particular situation of 
island states, trade imbalances, diseconomies of scale, the difficulties of creating competition among 
ports and poorly maintained and outmoded port infrastructure facilities. The state of affairs is having a 
negative impact on trade, economic growth and sustainable development and needs to be addressed as 
a regional priority; 
 The desirability to de-scale the current state of affairs in which construction, technology and 
institutional linkages in respect of port infrastructure, transportation and logistics appear to be 
overwhelmingly in favor of a single international actor. Should the present state of affairs persist 
unchecked, it could limit opportunities for other actors to become engaged in regional investment and 
possibly inhibit healthy competition.  Furthermore, the status quo may place strains on the Region‟s 
foreign relations with partner nations in North America which perceive China as a rival rather than as a 
global competitor; 
 The desirability for Caribbean Community Member states to engage with China in a manner that 
promotes regional integration, at the heart of which is the ultimate goal of achieving a single market 
and economy in a single economic space. Regional integration should therefore underpin CARICOM 
engagements with China, notwithstanding the shared benefits of such engagements. 
Recommendation 1 
Regional level: Bilateral and multilateral engagements with China in the sphere of port infrastructure 
development require coordinated and integrated approaches.  This may require the establishment of an 
overarching entity. A number of intergovernmental institutions exist in the region with a history of cooperative 
interactions and collective responses to shared concerns, among the more exemplary is the Implementation 
Agency for Crime and Security (IMPACS). Intergovernmental bodies such as IMPACS could be emulated as 
the region braces for the coming on stream of mega sectoral projects in locations such as Guyana and Trinidad 
and Tobago.  
Recommendation 2 
Regional level: The security dimension of port infrastructure development needs to be carefully considered at 
the highest decision-making level of the Caribbean Community i.e. the Conference of Heads of Government, 
given the fact that the transportation sector is a rapidly expanding and important strategic sector in the region.  
Accordingly, port infrastructure should be prioritized and placed on the agenda of the annual Inter-Sessional 
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Meetings of CARICOM Heads of Government. 
Recommendation 3 
National Level: There is need to address inefficiencies at the Region‟s main ports at national level through a 
series of systemic layering. This was iterated in a 2016 study published by the Caribbean Development Bank, 
titled “Transforming the Caribbean Port Services Industry” which attributed the inefficiencies to the growing 
unmet demand for port infrastructure investment, inadequate infrastructure, poor maintenance and under-
capitalization. Most importantly, the report advised, as reiterated below, that national initiatives must 
incorporate the concept of „human settlements‟ and host governments should assume a lead role in the following 
activities:  
 Ensuring that areas adjacent to port estates proceed in accordance with authorized land use plans; 
 Ensuring that the design of ports caters for multi-user purposes to accommodate the mushrooming 
cruise ship and yachting sectors in the region; 
 Putting measures in place so that infrastructural layouts minimize the environmental impacts and 
constraints to effective waste management; 
 Institutionalizing policies, green taxes and development charges for major land users while ensuring 
these are coordinated and enforced in order to maximize revenue collection opportunities and make 
port services management a self-financing enterprise; 
Recommendation 4.  
The strictest enforcement of open procurement codes and practices supported by acceptable standards of public 
accountability in the award of port development contracts in CARICOM is crucial at this stage. Such a course of 
action must be undergirded by robust procurement legislation at domestic level that accords with the relevant 
article provisions of international conventions and treaties governing corruption and money laundering and the 
institutionalization of a global taxation governance regime geared toward tracking and tracing the operations of 
transregional multinational enterprises. 
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